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Abstract
This letter assesses the impact of a variation in access to a targeted loan pro-
gram from Brazil’s development bank on investment and productivity. Results
suggest that eligible firms increased their relative investment rate and produc-
tivity, but results are robust only for permanent rather than temporary improve-
ments in access to credit.
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1 Introduction
This paper uses a variation in access to a targeted loan program from the Brazilian
Development Bank (BNDES) to assess the causal effect of better credit conditions on
investment and productivity of Brazilian manufacturing firms. BNDES is the main
financing institution for productive investment in the country and it offers subsidized
interest rate for long-term investments. The estimated causal effects point to positive
shifts in the trend for investment rates and productivity indexes on average, however,
after considering firm and year fixed effects, it remains statistically significant only for
the permanent changes on credit conditions.
Our empirical strategy resembles that of Banerjee and Duflo [2014] in evaluating
whether or not firms are credit constrained in India, but the question studied in this
paper is distinct to theirs. The similarity is on the use of an exogenous variation
in access to a lending program as the identification strategy. Their paper “estimates
the impact of short term capital loans, not that of long term investment credit” [Banerjee
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and Duflo, 2014, p. 575], whereas the BNDES credit policies were designed to meet
long term investment needs.1 As a consequence, they focused on the policy effect on
firms’ short term outcomes (credit limit, interest rate, sales, among other variables)
but not on investment and productivity, which constitute the variables of interest of
this paper.
2 The BNDES Credit Intervention
BNDES is the main financing agent for development in Brazil. Its lending portfolio is
larger than the World Bank and has been used primarily to finance the expansion of
industry and infrastructure. The Bank is responsible for more than 70 percent of long
term credit in the country.
BNDES has adopted policies targeting firms considered to be more financially
constrained, namely low-revenue firms. Interest rates as well as collateral constraints
were designed to better support this group. The Bank offers subsidized interest rate
for long-term investments but benefits were defined as a function of firms gross oper-
ating revenue. BNDES offers several credit lines and products. Among those target-
ing small and medium size firms are: FINAME, BNDES automático and BNDES card.
The first two are designed to finance physical capital accumulation or investments
in intangible capital meant to increase productivity, and together they compose the
largest outlay. Nonetheless, credit conditions are size-dependent and classification
changed over time, which motivates out identification strategy. BNDES card facili-
tates acquisition of inputs, but credit conditions are the same for all firms.2
The level of the subsidy on borrowing rates depends on the firm size in terms of
gross operating revenue but firms’ classification changed over time. From 1997 to
2002, all firms with revenues between R$6 millions and R$35 millions were classified
as medium firms and they faced the same credit conditions offered by BNDES. In
2002, those with gross operating revenue within R$6 and R$10.5 millions started to
be treated as small firms, with the possibility of applying for better credit conditions,
while firms with revenues above R$10.5 millions were still treated as medium firms.
For instance, under FINAME and BNDES Automático, small firms paid at least 1.5
percentage point less in interest rate per year than medium firms and the interest rate
differential could reach 3 percentage points depending on the sector and location of
the firm.3 Small firms had also favourable loan conditions in terms of smaller collat-
1Antunes et al. [2015] and Buera et al. [2013] study such a policy in a macro-development quantita-
tive environment.
2Despite recent expansion of the BNDES card, particularly after 2009, it does not reach 10% of dis-
bursements made by the other two products.
3BNDES resources come mainly from workers’ contributions and loans from the Brazilian Treasury
at a rate below the Central Bank interest rate. In 2002-2004, for instance, the yearly nominal interest
paid by government bonds was about 18%, while the government lent to BNDES at about 11%. The
final component in BNDES credit lines is an interest rate spread of about 2.5 percentage points in 2002-
2
eral requirements and larger grace periods. A new reform took place in 2004, when
the two groups, small and medium-size firms, started facing the same credit condi-
tions. The causal effect is estimated considering new-small firms (revenue between
R$6Mi and R$10Mi) as treated and two different control groups: the always-small
firms (revenue below R$6Mi), unaffected by the reclassification, and always-medium
firms (revenue above R$10Mi), affected only two years latter. The comparison with
the former can be interpreted as estimating the effect of a permanent change in credit
conditions, while the comparison with the latter for the effect of two years of better
credit conditions. For this reason, when estimating the causal effect for the tempo-
rary change in credit conditions, we will focus the comparison of new-small firms
solely with medium-size firms, according to the first classification, operating within
the 2002-04 period and track them back and forth in time. For the permanent shock,
the same is done but with the control group composed by always-small firms, the
always treated group.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data
Firm level data were obtained from a confidential survey constructed by the Brazilian
Institute of Statistics (IBGE),4 called the Annual Industrial Survey (PIA), which mon-
itors the performance of Brazilian firms in the extractive and manufacturing sectors.5
They are yearly survey from 1996 to 2010 from all firms with 30 or more employees.
The variables used include the number of employees, value added, gross production
value, investment and operating revenue.
The summary statistics are shown in Table 1. New small firms, those which were
classified as medium before 2002, as expected, presented on average a lower num-
ber of employees and a higher exit rate relative to the always medium firms group.
Not only the average labor productivity of the two groups were very similar, but also
the standard deviation. Figure 1(b) depicts the distribution of the labor productivity
while Figure 1(c) shows the distribution of Total Factor Productivity (TFP). The dis-
tribution of size, as number of employees per firm, is depicted on Figure 1(a). Firms
on the new-small group are more disperse and positive skewed on this regard. More-
over, though not exposed here, the sectorial composition is quite similar for both
groups of firms.
There are some sample restrictions for the causal effect estimation. In order to
avoid confounding effects of other policies adopted towards manufacturing firms
2004 and a financial intermediaries spread [cf., Ribeiro and DeNegri, 2010, Ottaviano and de Sousa,
2008].
4The dataset cannot be extracted from the Brazilian statistical office.
5We focus on the manufacturing sector as defined by the Brazilian sector classification CNAE 2.0
(sectors 10 to 33).
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Table 1: Summary statistics. Source: PIA, IBGE.
Group Variable Mean se(Mean) sd Median N
Small Gross Revenue (Millions) 2.69 0.01 2.73 1.74 166807
New firms 22% 0.00 0.41 - 166807
Incumbent firms 70% 0.00 0.46 - 166807
Firms exiting 12% 0.00 0.32 - 166807
Investment 4% 0.01 3.51 0.00 150905
Total employees 58 0.11 46 46 166807
Blue collar Employees 49 0.10 41 38 166807
ln(Labor Prodty) 9.68 0.00 1.41 9.80 165377
Ln(TFP)(OLS) 6.18 0.00 1.49 6.47 113822
HHI 0.029 0.000 0.057 0.016 166807
New Small Gross Revenue (Millions) 7.81 0.01 1.15 7.72 22249
New firms 12% 0.00 0.33 - 22249
Incumbent firms 84% 0.00 0.37 - 22249
Firms exiting 5% 0.00 0.22 - 22249
Investment 4% 0.00 0.19 0.01 21852
Total employees 92 0.47 70 73 22249
Blue collar employees 73 0.42 63 57 22249
ln(Labor Prodty) 10.54 0.01 1.23 10.67 22171
Ln(TFP)(OLS) 6.28 0.01 1.45 6.57 19132
HHI 0.034 0.001 0.078 0.018 22249
Always Medium Gross Revenue (Millions) 18.70 0.03 6.83 17.00 40069
New fimrs 9% 0.00 0.29 - 40069
Incumbent firms 88% 0.00 0.33 - 40069
Firms exiting 3% 0.00 0.18 - 40069
Investment 3% 0.00 0.49 0.01 39782
Total employees 149 0.65 130 112 40069
Blue collar employees 115 0.57 113 84 40069
ln(Labor Prodty) 10.89 0.01 1.13 10.96 39979
Ln(TFP)(OLS) 6.27 0.01 1.37 6.53 36223
HHI 0.041 0.001 0.101 0.018 40069
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(a) Number of Employees (b) Ln(Labor Productivity) (c) Ln(TFP)
Figure 1: Distribution of Size, Labor Productivity and TFP. Source: PIA, IBGE.
placed on low income regions, we restricted our sample to the most industrialized
region, the Southeast, composed by the states of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Espírito
Santo and Minas Gerais. Our sample is restricted to firms operating between 2002-
2004, preserving their classification at this period, when the shift in classification took
place. We end up with 14,003 firms with more than 30 employees and we keep track
of them over time.
3.2 Productivity Measures
Two measures of productivity were constructed: labor productivity and a TFP mea-
sure.6 Besides the simplicity of our labor productivity measure, it carries important
information combining the importance of both tangible and intangible capital on
workers’ productivity; and, it is not affected by measurement error of firms’ capital
stock. Labor productivity is simply defined as value added per worker.
6The capital stock is constructed through the perpetual inventory method. For firms starting before
1996, the initial capital is computed from information on the accounted depreciation, available in the
PIA database. The production measure and intermediate consumption are deflated by a sectorial price
index, IPA-OG (3-digits), while investment are deflated by an investment price index, IPA-DI. The
investment rate is the ratio of investment over capital stock; and investment itself is composed by
the sum of acquisition, improvements and reduction on the previous capital stock divided by value
added. The TFP measure is a residual term based on an ordinary least square regression. Parameters
are sector specific, to account for sectorial heterogeneity on labor and capital shares at two-digit level
industries. We consider a production function such as Y(A,K, LWC, LBC) = AKβkL
βWC
WC L
βBC
BC M
βM where
K denotes capital stock, LWC and LWC are white-collar labor and blue collar labor, and M corresponds
to raw materials.
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3.2.1 Aggregate Productivity
Aggregate productivity measures is defined as the weighted average of firm’s pro-
ductivity. The weights are defined by the firm’s market share, which is constructed
by their value added share. Aggregate productivity at sector s is
Pst =∑
i∈s
θistAist, (1)
where Aist is some measure (labor productivity or TFP) of firm i’s productivity, and
θist = VAist/∑i∈s VAist, and VA denotes value added.
It is convenient to define firm productivity relative to its sector productivity. Such
an index eases cross-section comparison for each year, avoiding differences in secto-
rial composition to drive further disparities. Over time, the index also facilitate the
comparison by accounting for the productivity growth of the sector as a whole, which
are not actually related to access to credit.
Pindexist = Aist/Pst. (2)
3.3 Causal Effect Estimation
After the BNDES reclassification in 2002, part of the medium-size firms faced better
credit conditions for loans to long-term investment. The policy lasted two years and
was extended to include all medium size firms under the same conditions after 2004.
The goal is to compare the behavior of new-small firms to the always-small group as
well as to those always-medium. In other words, the treatment is being considered
new-small within 2002-2004 and two estimations will be implemented to infer effects
on both control groups.
The reduced form estimates for the standard Difference-in-Difference model can
be expressed by:
lnYit = β1NewSmallit + β2Postt + β3Postt × NewSmallit + X′itγ+ eit. (3)
The explained variable (productivity or investment) is Y, while NewSmall and Post
are dummy variables representing firms classification within 2002-2003 and the pe-
riod after intervention. Our parameter of interest is β3, which captures the difference-
in-difference between the conditional expected value of productivity before and after
the policy for each group of firms. That is, with no controls Xit:
β3 = {E[Yit|NewSmall = 1, Post = 1]− E[Yit|NewSmall = 1, Post = 0]}
− {E[Yit|NewSmall = 0, Post = 1]− E[Yit|NewSmall = 0, Post = 0]} . (4)
The time varying controls, represented by the vector Xit, are the deflated gross
revenue, state and sector dummies, the median of people employed and wage by
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firms in the same sector, value added by sector and the sector Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI).7
The validity of this identification strategy relies on the assumption that the change
in the threshold was exogenous to firms which could not precisely anticipate such
policy change implemented by the BNDES. The difference-in-difference (DID) strat-
egy adopted here is justified by some potential weakness associated with estimations
exploiting the discontinuity around the new cut-offs. First, regression discontinuity
analysis or DID for a optimal bandwith around the new classification are more sen-
sitive to marginal manipulations around the thresholds. Second, external validity
would be compromised even further. To control for size, as firms get away from the
cutoff, we explicitly included deflated revenue among the covariates.
The fixed effect model is a natural extension of our standard DID formulation and
can be expressed as:
lnYit = β3Postt × NewSmallit + X′itγ+ αi + ρt + eit. (5)
In this case changes common to all firms are captured by the time dummies and thus
are not a source of variation that identifies β3.
4 Results
4.1 The Causal Effect
We start by investigating the impact of this policy change on firms’ investment rate.
As can be seen in Figure 2, the unconditional mean of investment rate for new-small
firms seems to be quite sensitive to the program. Before 2002, medium size firms
presented similar levels and trends for investment rates, and after the change in
the threshold the uncondicional investment rate for the new-small group increased
sharply; while there was no significant shift for the always-medium group.8
The estimation results of Equation (3) for the investment rate are presented in
Table 2. The policy positively change conditional investment rates, when firm and
year fixed effects were not considered, and the impact was stronger for the perma-
nent change, captured by the DID between new-small and always-small groups. Fur-
thermore, the inclusion of firm and year fixed effects makes the effects for the tem-
porary change statistically insignificant. The two years of better credit conditions
does not seem enough to change new-small firms investment trend when compared
to other medium size firms with similar observable characteristics, while the per-
manent change did. In the comparison to always-small firms, considering firm and
7Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is measured as HHIst = ∑i∈s (Yist/∑i∈s Yist)
2. It is calculated yearly
at the sectorial level (2 digits). A high HHI index indicates market concentration.
8It is unclear so far why the average investment rate among firstly unaffected medium size firms
remains insensitive to the extension of benefits that took place in 2004. The absence of further controls
in this analysis invalidates a deeper interpretation.
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Figure 2: Log[Investment/(Capital Stock)]. New-small (Red) versus medium firms (Blue) and small
firms (Green). Source: Source: PIA, IBGE.
Table 2: Policy Effect on Investment
Investment Rate (Investment / Capital Stock)
New Small vs Always Medium
PostXEligible 0.0169*** 0.0049 -0.0007 -0.0009
(0.0051) (0.0088) (0.0122) (0.0147)
New Small vs Always Small
PostXEligible 0.4190*** 0.1681*** 0.5690*** 0.3390***
(0.0377) (0.0426) (0.0230) (0.0286)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
N Obs. 46491 32394 46491 32551
55687 42342 55687 42342
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Controls: deflated gross revenue, State dummies, median of people
employed, wage by firms in the same sector, value added by sector,
and the sectorial Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
Fixed Effects: Firm and Year fixed effects
year fixed-effects besides time varying controls, the investment rates in the new-small
group was raised, on average, by roughly 34% more after the policy.
Table 3 shows results of the difference-in-difference model with productivity mea-
sures as the explained variable. Similarly to the results based on the investment vari-
able, both labor productivity and TFP are not affected by the temporary policy when
firm and year fixed effects are introduced. On the other hand, the effect on produc-
tivity of a permanent shift of credit conditions is positive and statistically significant.
The conditional average labor productivity and TFP increased by 9% and 11%, re-
spectively, in the new-small firms when year and firm fixed effects are considered.
The estimation using relative measures of productivity are presented in Table 4.
The temporary policy effects remain not robust to the inclusion of firm and year fixed
effects, while conditional averages of labor productivity and TFP indexes increased
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Table 3: Policy Effect on Labor Productivity and TFP
Labor Productivity Total Factor Productivity
New Small vs Always Medium
Post X 0.0565 -0.0191 -0.0332 -0.0353 0.2461*** 0.1234*** -0.0287 -0.0404
Eligible (0.0293) (0.0298) (0.0234) (0.0268) (0.0340) (0.0316) (0.0247) (0.0282)
New Small vs Always Small
Post X 0.2641*** 0.6765*** 0.2490*** 0.0966*** 0.2479*** 0.3425*** 0.2330*** 0.1114***
Eligible (0.0263) (0.0304) (0.0118) (0.0157) (0.0300) (0.0306) (0.0136) (0.0178)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N Obs. 115709 88288 115709 88288 87296 67435 87296 67435
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
The productivity measures are represented in log terms and four models are estimated for each measure.
Controls: Similar to those of Table 2
Fixed Effects: Firm and Year fixed effects
13% and 10% more in the treated group when the permanent effect is investigated.
Table 4: Policy Effect on Labor Productivity and TFP Indexes
Labor Productivity Index Total Factor Productivity Index
New Small vs Always Medium
Post X 0.0792** 0.0302 -0.0282 -0.0474 0.2204*** 0.1127*** -0.0065 -0.0324
Eligible (0.0309) (0.0285) (0.0246) (0.0280) (0.0292) (0.0305) (0.0249) (0.0283)
New Small vs Always Small
Post X 0.2538*** 0.6656*** 0.2689*** 0.1322*** 0.1994*** 0.2780*** 0.2179*** 0.1058***
Eligible (0.0249) (0.0269) (0.0122) (0.0163) (0.0244) (0.0298) (0.0137) (0.0179)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N Obs. 46693 32470 46693 32470 42501 30188 42501 30188
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
The productivity measures are represented in log terms and four models are estimated for each measure.
Controls: Similar to those of Table 2
Fixed Effects: Firm and Year fixed effects
5 Concluding remarks
This paper estimated the causal effect of better credit conditions on firm’s productiv-
ity and investment decisions. Results support the hypothesis that financial constraint
for long-term investment matters for small and medium firm’s productivity and in-
vestment decisions, but effects are weak when such reduction of financial frictions
are temporary. When credit market conditions were permanently changed invest-
ment rate and productivity measures increased significantly.
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